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Book Reviews 
Milton and the Revolutionary Reader by Sharon Achinstein. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1994. Pp. xv + 272. $35.00. 
We Have Fish'd and Caught a Frog. In introducing her chapter on Paradise 
Lost with a quotation from that pamphlet of 1649, Sharon Achinstein will 
perhaps stir at least subliminal echoes of more recent controversies. Despite 
the brilliance of Stanley Fish's Surprised By Sin, reader-response criticism has 
not seemed to fulfill its original promise. Fish's readers are effectively time-
less, gradually yielding to the superior insight of the master-narrator; and, 
Achinstein points out, they "perform their acts solo." Milton and the Revolu-
tionary Reader breaks new ground in giving us a Milton who is at once a par-
ticipant in and an agent of the revolutionary changes of the mid-seventeenth 
century, and who aims at both reaching and producing readers who are like-
wise engaged-rlflfl audience in a very active sense. 
Milton himself occupies only part of the book's attention; the book appears 
in a welcome new series on "Literature in History" and Achinstein offers a 
general analysis of disruptions and innovations in the reading process in the 
revolutionary decades of the 1640s and 1650s. These amounted, Achinstein 
argues, to an early stage of what Habermas has termed a political public 
sphere. She has trawled deeply in the huge ocean of the Thomason Tracts 
and come up with much material that will be new even to specialists on the 
period. Rather than offering a chronological account, the chapters follow the 
spiralling movement of ever more complex hermeneutic responses as tradi-
tional practices of reading were disrupted and conservatives tried to contain 
those challenges. In his trial in 1649 Lilburne "created a role for his audience 
to play" in appealing over the heads of his judges first to the jury and then, 
through printed pamphlets, to the nation. This kind of challenge to long-es-
tablished authority generated the reaction which Achinstein charts in her 
second chapter, where John Cleveland and Thomas Hobbes serve as con-
trasting examples of royalist responses to the Babel of new ideas. The third 
chapter examines the widening sphere of debate in pamphlets and political 
practice. The Putney Debates of 1647, in which some rank-and-file soldiers 
debated the principles of government with their superiors, offer a particu-
larly striking example of debate in practice, where urgent political impera-
tives meant that the more relaxed humanist model of arguing in utrarnque 
partern had to be modified. Yet the debate form might in fact be coercive, 
funnelling a spectrum of views into narrowly opposed partisan moulds: po-
litical exchange became propaganda. Parliamentarians were, however, more 
open to public debate than royalists, who had an inherited dislike of diffus-
ing mysteries of state too far down the social hierarchy, and thus presented 
the conflicts in terms of personalities rather than abstract ideas. The fourth 
chapter examines how writers and politicians, accepting that opposing ideas 
could not be kept out of circulation, sought to arm readers by lengthy en-
gagement with opponents' arguments. 
Milton's writings are viewed against this complex series of contexts. Even 
though his immediate concerns may have shifted a great deal in the 1640s 
and 50s, "Milton was surprisingly committed to a single goal, that of making 
his public fit to achieve self-governance through training in virtue." Areopagi-
tica fits very well into her argument as a tract which makes the act of read-
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ing into a heroic struggle, a paean to the emergent public sphere. Eikonok-
lastes engages in a process of hermeneutical correction which, as Achinstein 
shows :ill an interesting section, is developed :in the visual imagery of Para-
dise Lost. Milton's epic is difficult to historiciz€, partly because it once seems 
to offer topical anchorings and then disconcertingly unmoors itself from 
them. Achinstein offers one such example, a neglected genre of "Parlimnent 
of Hell" satires in which Parliamentarian leaders aTe presented in terms sim-
ilar to Milton's Satan and fallen angels. This analogy is for Achinstein part of 
a "repeated strategy of provoking allegorical interpretations while refusing 
to supply an uneqUivocal 'key' to the allegory," and thus educating fit read-
ers. Similarly, the image of the sun both presents and subverts the kinds of 
easy link between natural and cosmic orders that were being made by post-
Restoration royalists. 
Achinstein thus offers us a Milton who, far from standing aloof from the 
cornnl0n herd, was passionately cOlnmitted to involving them into his own 
struggles. She offers a new and thought-provoking angle on the connections 
between poetry and revolutionary politics. Whether commenting on Milton 
or on little-known pamphlets, she writes with wit and energy. There are 
great strengths in her method of concentrating on the process of reading 
rather than merely classifying the different political alignments. There may, 
however, be attendant problems. She does not depart as far as might initially 
be expected from Fish's somewhat abstract model of reading: we are dealing 
in the main with ideal types, and, while Lilbume and Milton figure in this 
book, we are not given Lilburne's comments on the First Defence. Some of the 
alignments produced by this focus on the hermeneutics of reading look 
rather odd: for example, members of the Hartlib circle are linked with royal-
ists in their fear of the Babel of political revolution, yet a linguistic politics 
that from today's perspective may appear conservative did not necessarily 
entail a conservative stance on questions of religion and politics. Achinstein 
is much concerned with the concept of propaganda, and distinguishes its 
one-sidedness from the more open search for truth that for her characterizes 
truly revolutionary reading. Yet it may be that one problem in understand-
ing Milton's historical position has been the desire to mark off his lofty ideal-
ism from the vulgar polemics of more engaged figures. William Empson was 
being characteristically perverse when he tried to show that Milton had 
foisted a forged prayer into Eikol1 Basilike in order to discredit the king, yet 
he was recalling his own delight in tl1e possibilities of black propaganda 
when working with the B.B.C. in wartime. Empson's awareness of the con-
straints, and also the challenges, of writing for a definite cause is an impor-
tant aspect of the period that is in danger of getting lost when the dominant 
hermeneutic ideal is one of open-mindedness. 
Historians of reading have to account for the fact that the lofty Milton was 
a close friend of the arch-propagandist and turncoat Marchamont Nedham. 
In Milton and the Revolutionary Reader Nedham and other representatives of 
the emergent periodical press remain somewhat shadowy figures, and it 
must be said that Achinstein's handling of journalism reflects the deeply un-
developed state of research on that topic, with a number of minor inaccura-
cies. Milton's links with Nedham reinforce Achinstein's refreshing challenge 
to conventional ideas of Milton's elitism. On the other hand, there may still 
I 
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be problems in Milton's particular relationship with the public sphere that 
mark him off from many of the pamphleteers Achinstein discusses. She 
writes that Milton stages the argument in Areopagitica "as if he were plead-
ing before the Athenian Areopagus, a public place where ordinary mens' 
voices would be welcome"; but the Areopagus was an aristocratic counter-
weight to the democratic Assembly, and Isocrates, Milton's generic model 
here, praised it because it might contain popular unruliness. Just what that 
allusion is doing in the pamphlet remains a matter of much debate, and it 
need not invalidate Achinstein's general analysis: as she says, Milton is con-
cerned with an ideal audience of the political future, and such an audience 
could take on board both democratic openness and a sense of the need for 
social discipline. All the same, the welcome that Milton afforded to the pub-
lic sphere had well-defined limits. Charting and understanding those limits 
is an important further task; but Achinstein has made a major contribution 
both to setting Milton in history and to opening up histories that moved be-
yond Milton's own frames of reference. 
Magdalen College, Oxford David Norbrook 
In the Theatre of Romanticism: Coleridge, Nationalism, Women, by Julie A. Carl-
son. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xiii + 267. $49.95. 
Poetic drama has long been considered the problem child of the Romantic 
canon. Critics have so often dismissed, ridiculed, explained away and (more 
cruelly still?) apologized for the genre that it can feel disorienting to come 
upon Goethe's unstinting admiration for Mnnfred, or Coleridge's for The Bor-
derers, or Shelley's for Cain-tempting one to still one's cognitive dissonance 
by convicting the whole set of mutual flattery. Revisionist attempts to rescue 
at least some examples of Romantic drama from a tradition of malign neglect 
have been most successful when cutting the Unatural" link between drama 
and theater and reconceptualizing the genre as "mental theater" (Byron's 
term) rather than "closet drama," experiments in generic hybridity (Mnnfred 
is subtitled a "dramatic poem," Prometheus Unbound a "lyrical drama") 
rather than stage plays manques. Inevitably, the revisionist line has recently 
come in for revision itself, by critics mOTe interested in issues of theatricality 
and performativity and in the relation of both to historical and social change 
in an era that witnessed the theatricalization of politics and the politicization 
of theater. Julie Carlson's In the Theatre of Romanticism is the most substantial 
and authoritative of these newer studies; it usefully alters the terms for criti-
cism of Romantic drama and makes the genre seem not only worth sus-
tained attention (what isn't these days?) but exciting, even trendy-no apolo-
gies here. Even more impressive, Carlson has made the study of Romantic 
drama seem vital precisely because, not in spite of, its reputation as "bad the-
atre" (2). 
Carlson renders theater central rather than marginal to Romantic-Era Brit-
ish culture in several overlapping ways. Drawing on the work of cultural 
historians of the French Revolution, Carlson argues that political and theatri-
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cal forms of representation come to inform one another and manifest a 
shared problematic on both sides of the channel during the period of the Re-
volutioary and NapoleOnic wars. Theater, as public spectacle, also becomes a 
crucial site for the formation and display of a new British national ethos to I 
counter the no less spectacularized threat of a newly consolidated French I 
tian of thought to action, of metaphysics to stage business, becomes a forum 
for publicly working out the relation of introspection to performance, of 
I 
Nation. The Romantic poet's theater, with its all too well-known dispropor- I 
theory to exection, in a period of violence and accelerated change. Finally, 
gender comes (literally) into play in Carlson's study as action and the per- '1,:,1 
forming body become female-identified, lyricism and the philosophic mind 
become coded as male. Romantic antitheatricalism is reinterpreted as an 
ideologically overdetermined locus of social conflict rather than a pragmatic 
response to inadequate stage conditions, with anti-revolutionary, anti-
Napoleonic, and misogynistic valences, not to mention a touch of class 
anxiety. 
Carlson resituates Romantic drama not only through her tum-or as Carl-
son herself, over-enamored of the coy parenthesis, might put it, (re)turn-to 
theater, but also by giving Coleridge, usually upstaged by Wordsworth, By-
ron, and Shelley, the best part of her attention. She argues compellingly that 
far from representing a turn away from politics, Coleridge'S theory of imagi-
nation is deeply invested in questions of nationalism, that the formation of 
"nation" and "imagination" are "mutually constitutive processes" (33). 
Shakespeare, "England's master mind" (17), is deployed by Coleridge not 
only as a model for nation-building through theatrical representation and as 
national icon in himself, but also as exemplar, particularly in Hamlet, of the 
anatomy of mind in an age of revolutionary upheaval and intensified com-
mercial activity, teaching England to reflect before it acts, "making theatre a 
reform school for the public mind" (5). In this account, Germany becomes a 
necessary detour en route to the intersection of England, Shakespeare, and a 
reformed and reforming drama, as Schiller anticipates the "turn to theatre to 
redress [Revolutionary] social upheaval" in his Wallenstein plays, two of 
which Coleridge translated in 1800. Schiller demonstrates how the esthetic 
mode, in its very detachment, can annul former principles of action "so that 
one can envision, and then effect, new alternatives" (76), though Wallenstein 
also evinces the dilemma involved in moving from introspection to action 
such that by acting, "humans alienate themselves from their ideal selves" 
(77). Coleridge'S plays variously thematize, stage, and seek to evade this 
moment of self-alienation and problematize notions of action, illusion, and 
representation in the process. 
Carlson's readings of Coleridge's verse dramas are convincing and make a 
signal contribution to Coleridge studies, impelling one to find new interest 
in these relatively neglected works (and making Zapolya seem interesting is a 
neat trick all by itself). Coleridge'S dramatic career is divided into three 
phases: a youthful one, represented by The Fall of Robespierre and Osorio, in 
which vengance plays a legitimate function, though an rather vexed one in 
the latter work; a middle phase, represented by Remorse (the revised Osorio), 
in which physical violence is rejected, remorse (in the service of self-
reformation) displaces revenge, and yet action remains attractive for its man-
c 
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ifestation of male "potency" (105); and a final (post-Napoleonic) phase, rep-
resented by Zapolya, in which a nation's legitimate rulers are restored with-
out vengeance and action is nearly entirely given over by contemplative men 
in favor of active women. This last phase both culminates and curtails Cole-
ridge's adventure with the stage, as the spectacle of female agency embodied 
in the theater (with the concomitant feminization of the introspective male 
hero) engenders an antitheatrical reflex in the male poet that is repeated in 
contemporary male criticism of Shakespeare productions and again in criti-
cism of Romantic drama that would decouple theater and text. 
How well does Carlson's refocalizing of Romantic drama through Cole-
ridge, nationalism, and gender serve as a basis for rethinking the genre (if 
genre it can be called) as a whole? Insofar as the "problematics of action in a 
revolutionary age" (99) which Carlson delineates to such effect in Coleridge 
can be seen in works like Byron's Mnrino Faliero and Sardanapalus or in Shel-
ley's Cenci (and implicitly in Wordsworth's Borderers, though Carlson doesn't 
spell this out), the approach succeeds quite well and lends a new sense of 
continuity to this group of texts. But the emphasis on theatricality also draws 
attention away from several works that have long been considered the most 
successful examples of a markedly uneven genre. A study of Romantic verse 
drama that shows more interest in Marino Faliero than in Cain, that finds 
room for atho the Great but not for Manfred, that requires an extended dis-
cussion of Zapolya but cannot accommodate Prometheus Unbound, finally 
seems as skewed as earlier studies which proved unable to do justice to Re-
morse and Sardanapalus. What seems needed now are studies that can follow 
Carlson's lead in recovering the significance of the theater and of theatrical-
ity for Romantic-era poets attempting to renew the drama, while keeping 
sight of their interest not simply in juxtaposing lyric and dramatic modes 
but in complicating or even collapsing the generic border between them, 
sometimes leaving the stage behind (though not without Significant traces) in 
the process. If Carlson's lead should not be followed blindly, however, In the 
Theatre of Romanticism remains, for now, the best guide we have to under-
standing the Significance of dramatic poetry in the romantic era. 
Boston College Alan Richardson 
Wordsworthian Errancies: The Poetics of Cultural Dismemberment by David Coll-
ings. Baltimore and London: The Johns HOpkins University Press, 1994. Pp. 
xii + 287. $39.95. 
If one requirement of canonical longevity is the author's capacity to speak 
to the critical concerns of whatever age in which his or her texts may reside, 
David Collings's Wordsworthian Errancies gives clear signs that Wordsworth 
will be with us well into the next millennium. Drawing on a wide range of 
contemporary cultural and literary theory, as well as current (and not so cur-
rent) Wordsworth critics, David Collings shows how many of Wordsworth's 
most discussed texts anticipate many of today's critical trends, in particular 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, cultural deconstruction, and, most provocatively, 
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queer studies. Although occasionally marred by weak argument, Collings's 
book is a brave and largely successful attempt to bring Wordsworth's text 
into dialogue with the critical avant-garde. 
Squaring off against those who would contain Wordsworth's poetry 
through historicist critique, Collings offers up a post-modern Wordsworth, 
arguing that the poet "is far more outrageous than readers have generally 
recognized, that he not only champions deviance and a nearly overt homo-
eroticism but links them intimately with his status as a poet" (13). Focussing 
on Wordsworth's literal and figurative wanderings, Collings shows how the 
poet's concern with cultural dislocation (or dismemberment) gradually de-
velops into the primary source of his poetic power. This perverse empower-
ment occurs in several discernable stages, each dramatized in particular 
poetic works: In the Salisbury Plain poems Wordsworth moves from conven-
tional anti-war protest poetry, to a gothic-oriented preoccupation with cul-
tural dislocation itself. While intimating the "illegitimacy of the symbolic 
order" (59) in The Borderers, Wordsworth also criticizes those who, like its 
central character, "would choose for cultural dismemberment" (66). Cultural 
critique turns inward in "Incipient Madness," The Ruined Cottage, and "The 
Thorn," poems in which the "vacillation of the subject" (77) becomes a 
source of masochistic pleasure. Such pleasure, and the feeling of control as-
sociated with it, is more directly courted in "The Discharged soldier," "The 
Cumberland Beggar," and the later drafts of The Ruined Cottage, while, in 
Part One of the 1799 Prelude, "cultural disaster" and the poet's "mashochistic 
vocation" (118) are conjoined in the pleasurable pain characteristic of the 
spots of time. In Michael, Wordsworth's developing sense of the problematics 
of II culture" thwarts his best attempts to pass that culture on, and, in an es-
pecially inSightful analysis of The Prelude's "Arab dream" and "the crossing 
of the alps" episodes, we find Wordsworth recognizing the apocalyptic 
power of deviancy, something which, through the inadequacy of language, 
he calls "imagination" (199). Appropriately, Collings rounds out his discus-
sion of Wordsworth's errancy with a discussion of The Prelude's French Revo-
lution chapters, whose medley of genres demonstrates the poet's sense that 
history is ultimately unreadable. Indeed, as Wordsworth's celebration of Ro-
bespierre's beheading suggests, "history" achieves its primary meaning not 
through objective representation, but through primitive forms of ritual, in 
particular the versions of human sacrifice which, as Collings points out, 
haunt Wordsworth's work. 
As many readers will perceive, Collings's walk through Wordsworth's 
wild side is, in itself, not radically new. Peckham's If dark romanticism" has 
found treatment before-especially in Bloom and Hartman, the latter per-
haps vying with de Man as Collings'S primary influence. Nevertheless, Coll-
ings does manage to enmesh these themes in the Lacanian fractured self, the 
post-structnral always already collapSing linguistic or cultnral order, as well 
as the masochistic strand of queer studies. These theories allow Collings to 
make surprising connections betvveen the poems he treats. To be sure, a few 
of Collings more hyperbolic interpretations-especially his fresh take on The 
Prelude's rowboat episode (137)-would be enough to make Matthew Arnold 
blush, if not send into cardiac arrest. Moreover, for all his comments on 
Wordsworth's rhetoric, Collings, like many de Man-inspired critics, seems to 
, 
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know little of the eighteenth-century rhetorical theory which informs Words-
worth's concepts of language, self, and culture. 
This having been said, there is a great deal in Collings's book which, while 
often not completely persuasive, does, like any good pioneering work, point 
to territory which future critics will settle more securely. Not only is Words-
worth's canonical stature assured, but what is more exciting, so is our con-
tinuing sense of the poet's unfathomable strangeness. 
Hofstra University Scott Harshbarger 
Literature, Education, and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice, 1780-1832 by 
Alan Richardson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xviii + 
327. $54.95 
The Cambridge Studies in Romanticism series includes both reconsidera-
tions of major Romantic writers and provocative accounts of the importance 
of less familiar, certainly less taught figures, including Helen Maria Williams 
and William Cobbett. Alan Richardson's book is a welcome mixture of both 
trajectories: a thorough, well-researched investigation of the education de-
bates of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, offering extensive 
commentary on "popular" didactic literature by figures such as Hannah 
More and Maria Edgeworth, Literature, Education, and Romanticism also de-
scribes the (canonical) ROlnantic response to and representation of childhood, 
reading, education, and "ideology" ("ideology," as Richardson reminds us, is 
a term that emerged from post-Revolutionary debates about education). The 
idea is to situate a specifically "Romantic" literary production within the con-
text of a more general cultural revolution; Richardson is less interested, how-
ever, in travelling the well-trodden ground of political and industrial trans-
formation than in carefully describing educational institutions-he regards 
"literature" as an educational institution-crucially involved in developing a 
"consensual" model of subject-formation. As he points out, "we tend now to 
think of literacy in terms of democratization or even 'empowerment'" (65), 
but Richardson demonstrates how educational reforms and print culture de-
signed to universalize literacy also worked to subordinate not only children, 
but also women, the working classes, and colonial subjects. 
The chronological dimensions of Richardson's project are, he declares, de-
termined less by an uncritical adoption of traditional literary-historical ver-
sions of the Romantic "era" than by his sense of a "revolution in schooling": 
by 1832, universal literacy was an avowed aim of liberal thinkers and con-
sensual rather than "repressive" models of learning had come to dominate, 
models which meant that fantasy and imaginative literature in general had a 
greater role to play in subject-formation. This framing enables Richardson to 
equate Romanticism with "the emergence of 'Literature' as such, a cultural 
institution predicated on a canonical set of 'imaginative' works, dissemi-
nated through schools and centralized publishing venues, and managed by a 
professional group of critics and interpreters" (31). Thus the relation between 
literature and education is "not simply a matter of setting a literary fore-
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ground against a social-historical background," since literature "play[sl a .\ 
material role in education" (33). In Richardson's account, the debate about 
what role, if any, imaginative literature or fantasy should play in children's 
education is absolutely central to understanding both the ideological dimen- i 
sions of education reform and the formal dimensions of Romantic literature. II 
If readers familiar with Althusser recognize in educational institutions and 
consensual models of subject-formation merely the "ideological" technolo-
gies of power, Richardson's thorough investigation of the historical field 
means to complicate broad theoretical claims by calling attention to the pro-
liferation of ideas of education and kinds of literature; as he points out, "re-
production theories cannot by themselves explain the development over time 
of such systems" (27). Nor are the ideological effects of a given system of . i 
education or literary text always clear. In the first two chapters of Richard- i 
son's book, which survey, respectively, ideas of childhood and the related 
education reforms of the late eighteenth century, we learn that the historical 
decline of grammar schools and instruction in classical languages is related 
to the rise of the "consensual" ideology of education. As he points out in re-
viewing the influential educational theories of Locke and Rousseau, rote 
learning was inimical to a consensual model of subject-formation: how could 
the child "agree" to the authority of a text if she or he could not understand 
it? Rationalist reformers therefore aimed, and were ably assisted in this aim 
by children's book publishers, to follow Locke's dictum that children be 
taught to reason "always in very few and plain words" (56). If Rousseau was 
more extreme in his rejection of books themselves as instruments of child-
hood education (even Robinson Crusoe was recommended only as a series of 
"object" lessons), the idea was the same: children, he argued in Emile, should 
be surrounded with objects of sense, which do not require "belief." Modulat-
ing Rousseau's position, the Edgeworths in Practical Education insist on an 
instruction that at least pairs words to definite things or concepts, therefore 
rejecting both fairy tales and poetry as reading materials for children, oppos-
fig "the common practice of having children memorize or recite poetryrl 
(57), since the child's vocabulary would thereby outstrip his or her sense of 
the word's meaning. 
Thus although "writers in the rationalist tradition and their Romantic crit-
ics are joined," Richardson writes, in their opposition to technologies of 
memorization (60), the consensual model, in positing an equation between 
learning information and understanding, is crucially at odds with Romantic 
education by the sublime. To illustrate "Romantic" criticism of the "systems" 
proposed by reformers like Edgeworth and Lancaster, Richardson quotes 
Southey's The Doctor: "Oh! What blockheads are those wise persons who 
think it necessary that a child should understand everything it reads" (5). 
Unsurprisingly, Romantic poets defended the importance of fantasy against 
the "efficiency" models of the rationalist educators, but Richardson points 
out the double valence of this defense. On the one hand, when Wordsworth 
and Coleridge "propose that the child be left by itself to confront gaps and 
limitations in its habitual thinking process" (57), they defend resistance to a 
remorselessly programmatic and normativized learning process; on the other 
hand, their tendency to represent the folk or fairy tale as an extension of "na-
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tural" education is a "subtly conservative" (123), ahnost Burkean reaction to 
the radical agenda of some educational reformers. 
Richardson wants to suggest that Romantic literature potentially occupies 
"an ideologically neutral 'open ground' between the radical pamphlet and 
the reactionary tract" (123)-also between the didactic lesson and the fairy 
tale or chapbook-because it utilizes the very "gaps" between language and 
meaning that lead rationalist educators and children's literature writers to 
censor riddles, puns, and satire. But he has some difficulty in locating the 
irony that would distinguish the Romantic text and subvert the goal of in-
forming a stable subject. For example, Blake's "The Little Black Boy" suppos-
edly critiques the discourse of colonialism, using a "scene of maternal 
instruction" (165) to reverse the black boy's relation to the English child, 
"placing him in the role of instructor" (164). But this role reversal, as 
Richardson's subsequent consideration of the "Madras" system of student-
tutors makes clear, can also be read as an internalization of authority rather 
than its subversion. 
While the rationalist premises of educational reform were often criticized by 
the Romantics, Richardson underscores their more ambivalent relation to the 
larger understanding of education as an institution of for the reproduction of 
social and cultural power. For example, the same Wordsworth who criticized 
educational reformers as "skilful usurers of time" and "wardens of our 
faculties" would later be, like Coleridge, an ardent supporter of the so-called 
"Madras" system of education, developed in India by Andrew Bell for the 
subaltern population. Richardson's analysis of the Madras system is 
faScinating, without question the most valuable part of the book. Romantic 
writers compare Bell's reform (and the parallel system developed by the 
Quaker, Joseph Lancaster) to (a) the steam-engine (Coleridge) and (b) the 
printing press (Southey and Wordsworth). These analogies are quite telling, 
insofar as they suggest that the subject-formation envisioned by the new 
pedagogy was allied both to the goal of industrial "progress" and to the 
conditions of print culture; Coleridge'S despised "reading Public" was 
indeed a Public produced by the systematization of reading and writing. 
Indeed, on almost every count, Richardson's overview of the context of the 
Romantic production of "literature" seems authoritative, well-researched 
and plaUSible. In Chapter III, surveying the children's literature produced in 
the period, he describes the publishing industry's response not only to the 
reform of education but also to its domestication; parental oversight of 
children's education demanded the proliferation of materials for home 
consumption. In Chapter IV, considering that other internal "subaltern" 
population, women, in relation to education reform, Richardson finds an 
interesting way to discuss not the women writers for the adult market who 
have been the mainspring of so much recent feminist work, but instead the 
so-called "Mrs. Teachwells" (Maria Edgeworth, Anna Barbauld, Eliza 
Fenwick) who reduced the fairy tale to a didactic instrument. In discovering 
an underlying association "of maternal with pedagOgical power" (167), 
Richardson might have profited from knowledge of Friedrich Kittler's 
brilliant chapter on late eighteenth-century German theories of teaching 
literacy, called "The Mother's Mouth," in Discourse Networks 1800/1900, but 
his narrow focus does have the advantage of providing numerous rewarding 
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anecdotes; we learn that both Mary Shelley and Elizabeth Villiers, a fictional 
character in Charles Lamb's Mrs. Leicester's School, are taught to read by their 
fathers by tracing the letters on their mothers' gravestones (78, 134). In the 
last chapter, on educational institutions and literature developed for the 
working classes, Richardson again manages to forge a series of convincing 
parallels: the child who will be "informed" by proper educational methods 
and materials serves a model for the worker who will assimilate habits of 
frugality and industry from adult eqUivalents of "Little Goody Two-Shoes" 
found in Harriet Martineau's Illustrations of Political Economy; moreover, as 
Richardson points out, Martineau "favors colonial settings" (228), thereby 
reinforcing the equation between the domestic and the colonial subaltern. 
VVl:lat distinguishes Literature, Education, and Romanticism is the astute and 
persuasive case it makes for the relevance of education debates about what 
and how children should read to discussions of the subject-formation and 
assimilation of colonized populations, women, and the working class. If this 
is an attempt to "race, class, and gender" the Romantic child, it is certainly 
not a programmatic one; at every rurn, Richardson attempts to nuance our 
sense of an "ideologically diverse" (111) literary production by providing us 
with a richly detailed context that establishes a conflicted rather than unitary 
model against which to measure Romantic representation. However, when 
Richardson attempts to cash in on his painstaking historical analysis, the re-
sults are sometimes disappointing. He discusses very few unexpected texts, 
and, with the exception of The Prelude, not a single long poem at any length. 
Nor does his extensive knowledge always prevent erroneous assertions. For 
example, his "reading of the archive" (10) enables him usefully to refine 
Lawrence Stone's four conventions for representing childhood; he describes 
the "transcendental" child of Romantic poetry as well as a "maternal" con-
vention, "marked by a unique attentiveness to the infant's body, the dangers 
involved in birthing it. . and the bond between child and mother" (12). 
Implicitly, Richardson opposes these latter two conventions; explicitly, he 
finds the maternal convention "only among women writers of the era" (11). 
Such a claim necessarily overlooks evidence to the contrary in Wordsworth's 
"The Mad Mother" and "The Forsaken Indian Woman," to say nothing of ac-
counts of (failed) surrogate nurturing by fathers in "Michael" and 
"Vaudracour and Julia." This would be a minor objection were it not for the 
fact that Richardson uses the absence of this "maternal convention" partly to 
characterize Romantic representation, described as "oddly disembodied" 
(15). But a parallel for Baillie's slobbering "varlet" can be found in Blake's 
"Infant Sorrow," as Barbauld's baby made "invisible" by the womb calls at-
tention to Wordsworth's conflation of maternity and supernarure in "The 
Thorn." 
Sometimes Richardson merely overstates his case, as with reading Franken-
stein as a "critique of female education" (204); while Richardson's contention 
that Walton's haphazard reading "allies him with most women of the 
period" is persuasive, especially given what we know of Mary Shelley, 
describing the novel as representing "the dilemma of the middle-class ado-
lescent girl, caught between equally unhappy alternatives" of haphazard ed-
ucation and a repressive disciplinary regime (205) is too obviously thesis-
driven. At other times, especially with Lyrical Ballads, he seems unaware of 
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relevant secondary work: there are no citations of Frances Ferguson, for ex-
ample, though she has written on Anna Barbauld's Lessons for Children in re-
lation to "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" and her 1/ dialectical" reading of 
"We Are Seven" would have complicated Richardson's presentation of the 
poem as a simple conflict betvveen education by nature and by culture. And, 
while Richardson's synthetic procedure of discussing "popular" literature 
with the same intelligence and energy he devotes to its canonized relative is 
admirable and productive, it sometimes occasions missteps. A plot sununary 
of Fenwick's Juvenile Library or (especially) Edgeworth's "The Birth-day Pres-
ent" is both needful and valuable; a plot summary of Mansfield Park is con-
siderably less so. Almost always, Richardson pr6ves sharper on the less fa-
miliar texts. Nonetheless, Literature, Education, and Romanticism provides, as 
its author had hoped, a valuable way of looking at "some of the channels 
through which Wordsworth's poetry passed on its way to becoming canoni-
cal" (263). 
University of California, Berkeley Celeste Langan 
Intersections: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy and Contemporary Theory edited by 
Tilottarna Rajan and David 1. Clark. Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1995. Pp. vii + 386. $21.95. 
This collection of fourteen essays by different writers beginS with an intro-
duction by the editors stating that the book's purposes include "recovering 
the philosophical idealism that contemporary theory rejects, but that is nev-
ertheless dialogically present within it" (6). The book concludes with Stanley 
Corngold's contention (in his essay "On Death and the Contingency of Criti-
cism: Schopenhauer and de Man") that "it is urgent now to reacquaint our-
selves, with due intensity, with the human subject" (375). 
The purposes and the quality of writing in the volume's fourteen essays 
are diverse in the extreme. In this review, I -will briefly indicate the contents 
of three of these esssays (by Christopher Norris, Rajan, and Andrew Bowie) 
which I regard as especially valuable contributions to the field, but I will 
mention at the outset that other contributors to the volume are John Sallis 
(who writes on Hegel and mimesis), David 1. Clark (on Schelling'S Philosoph-
ical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom), Judith Butler (on bodily 
subjection in Hegel's Phenomenology), Ned Lukacher (comparing Nietzsche 
and Freud on conscience and the will to power), Thomas Pfau (on moral 
agency and critical discourse), Arkady Plotnitsky (on a general theoretical 
framework associated with Hegel, quantum mechanics, and the theory of the 
unconscious), Eric Meyer (on postmodernity and romantic historicism), Paul 
Hamilton (on Sade and Stendhal as they anticipate more recent thinking 
about ideology), Jean-Pierre Mileur (affirming that M. H. Abrams, Harold 
Bloom, and British poets are practical whereas The Literary Absolute by 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, like the German romantic writing which that 
book treats, is theoretical), Mark Cheetham (comparing Derrida and Kant on 
"the sublime"), and Stanley Corngold (whose manifesto for "the human sub-
ject" ends with the slogan, "Just say 'No' to contingency" [375]). 
Norris's "Kierkegaard, de Man, and the Ethics of Reading" suggests that 
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Kierkegaard's pseudonymous and aesthetic writings covertly serve religion 
and edification, "ensnaring the reader in fictions and speculative arguments 
that would ultimately self-deconstruct" (39). "Kierkegaard carries decon-
struction only to the point where its strategies supposedly come up against 
an undeconstructible bedrock of authenticated truth" (41). However, citing 
de Man's argument about narrative performativity in Rousseau's writing, 
Norris observes that Kierkegaard's work and its ethical intent are liable to 
"further deconstructive reading" (57). 
Rajan's essay, "Language, Music, and the Body: Nietzsche and Decon-
struction," asks, "in what ways is Nietzsche different from de Man's repre-
sentation of him?" (147-48). Rajan suggests that Julia Kristeva offers a very 
different version of Nietzsche's importance: Kristeva "draws from the later 
Nietzsche a concern with the body as the material site of the unconscious" 
(153); Nietzsche's earlier works (via Kristeva) give "poetic language a cen-
trality it does not have" in later works (153-54). Referring to music and the 
body, Nietzsche "valoriz[esJ differance over logos" and "gives it a materiality 
it lacks in a critical practice that posits nothing outside the text" (155). Rajan 
explains "the semioticff in terms of Kristeva's difference from Lacan: "be-
cause of its association with the mother's body, the semiotic is also linked 
with a return to something more inward than the world of symbols con-
structed by the law of the father" (162). Kristeva's account "endows this de-
construction with an experiential rather than a purely linguistic dimension 
(163). And a "valorization of the aesthetic marks Kristeva's deconstruction as 
a form of romanticism" (165). 
Bowie's '''Non-Identity': The German Romantics, Schelling, and Adorno" 
is probably the only essay in the collection that all professional philosophers 
(however analytical) would recognize as thoroughly philosophical in its 
purposes and methods. Bowie argues that Adorno's conception of "non-
identity" is "simply wrong in one vital respect" (244). In German idealism 
after Kant, the dualism of world-in-itself and our knowledge was suppos-
edly overcome by methods that "end up repressing the object side of the di-
alectic." But "it is not possible to overcome the split of thinking and being 
from one side of the divide between the two." Both Schelling and Friedrich 
Schlegel "saw the consequences of this fact" as Hegel and Adorno did not 
(246). "Both Schelling and Adorno are convinced that Hegel too readily as-
similates everything into thought" (253); but in Negative Dialectics" Adorno 
has really just inverted Hegel, by now attributing the prior role of the sub-
ject in Hegel to the object" (255). Bowie concludes that "if the idea of non-
identity is to be appropriately understood ... it should not lead, as so much 
recent theory has, and some of Adorno's philosophical writings do, to the 
repression of subjectivity via the reduction of the subject to the happening of 
language or society" (259). 
From a scholarly point of view, one notices that (with rare and brief excep-
tions) the only historical context constructed in Intersections involves the 
comparison of one writer's abstract statements with another's. During de-
cades of political revolution, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Schlegel, and 
others among the German writers here treated were involved in some impor-
tant woddy conflicts, and their writings participate in these conflicts in ways 
that the book's essays do not indicate. Schelling's Philosophical Inquiries into 
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the Nature of Human Freedom (to mention only one example) takes in senses 
of the word "freedom" which are not as metaphysical as the reflections 
about the abyss of groundless unbeing which Clark offers in his essay on 
that treatise. In 1809, there was an obviously political dimension to Schell-
ing's statement that "what had initially been unruly had been brought to or-
der" (I quote James Gutmann's translation, 34), but that fact could hardly be 
guessed from a reading of Intersections. 
The essays in Intersections refer often to de Man: for example, Norris's use 
of de Man's work is astute in framing his perceptive critique of Kierke-
gaard's writings; but Rajan explicitly prefers Kristeva over de Man, and 
Corngold's defensive manifesto for "the human subject" represents de Man 
as a tlueat (because of de Man's insistence on contingency). An odd omission 
from the scholarly apparatus is the work of Gilles Deleuze, who is men-
tioned in a couple of lists of names, but whose work isn't cited at all: even 
apart from his Difference and Repetition, and aside from Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus (both written collaboratively with Felix Guattari), De-
leuze's books include full-length commentaries on Kant and Nietzsche which 
also have independent philosophical importance. 
In terms of the quality of philosophical descriptions, the variety among the 
essays is remarkable. Cheetham's understanding of Kant's negative account 
of "noumena" in connection with the "sublime" is commendable; and one 
need not share Bowie's view of Adorno and Hegel to admire the precision 
and clarity of his formulations. But whereas Bowie can qulte correctly state 
the negatively critical content of Kant's work with regard to putative "know-
ledge of things in themselves" (246), Clark's statement about "Kant's separa-
tion of real and phenomenal worlds" involves a serious philosophical mis-
take (91). Kant distingulshes phenomena (which are as real as we can get) 
from noumena, which, Kant says, are merely illusions of the human faculty 
of reason which is all the while occupied only with itself. 
I will mention only one other example of the quality of philosophical 
thinking represented in the other essays in Intersections: when Pfau writes 
that Hegel "redescribe[s] morality as social and discursive practice rather 
than as an inward presence ('conviction')" (230), it is not clear whether Pfau 
means to say simply that Hegel refers to such a description of morality, or 
whether Pfau means to say that Hegel affirms that (as a matter of fact) mo-
rality is a social practice rather than an inner conviction, or whether Pfau 
means to assert his own agreement with Hegel in either case. Does Pfau 
mean to assert that it was Hegel's inner conviction that morality is not a 
matter of inner conviction? Clearly Hegel could articulate a description of a 
particular concept of morality (or anything else) without believing or assert-
ing that morality itself is identical with the description; the features of a de-
scription do not necessarily belong to the thing described. In fact, it is He-
gel's customary way of proceeding to consider ways of conceiving things, 
rather than things. Perhaps Pfau means to assert that there is no such thing 
as morality external to assertions about it; or perhaps he means to affirm that 
Hegel said such a thing. But it is not clear from Pfau's essay what is being 
said here. 
When I think as an editor, I notice that some of the essays (by Norris, Ra-
jan, Hamilton, Bowie) are impressively well written and edited, and some 
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others are not. One of the essays (Clark's) is 68 pages long (about 100 pages 
in typescript), consisting of sentences whose obscurity would have prompted 
some editors to ask for stylistic work as well as abridgement. Other essays 
include uncorrected problems in subject-verb agreement, dating of sources, 
grammatical structure of sentences, and spelling; but my own experience as 
a coeditor of scholarly collections has taught me that recent changes in the 
procedures of scholarly publication have confused the division of labor in 
ways that have not always been good for the quality of editing. 
In their writing and in the quality of their arguments, however, the best of 
the essays in this collection are outstanding. In my view, the relationships 
between nineteenth-century philosophy and contemporary theory are as im-
portant as the editors and contributors indicate, and the book's contributions 
include both salutary emphasis on that general set of issues and some exem-
plary specific treatments. 
Texas A&M University Terence Allan Hoagwood 
Healing the Republic: The Language of Health and the Culture of Nationalism in 
Nineteenth-Century America by Joan Burbick. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1994. Pp. x + 355. $59.95. 
More than thirty books are published each year which consider concep-
tualizations of the human body. Many of these publications focus on bodily 
representations as articulated synchronically in languages of related disci-
plines. Burbick's study precisely fits this recent and burgeoning intellectual 
activity. Her main thesis centers on how the discourse of medicat legal, po-
litical, and literary writings reveals cultural assumptions and anxieties as in-
scribed in the common flesh of the body in nineteenth-century America, es-
peCially as interpreted by its middle-class spokespersons and authorities. 
In fact, the rivalry among newly developing authorities is one of this 
book's most interesting points. As Benjamin Rush's epoch of bloodletting 
and cold-water cures (not to mention his suggested treatment for necro-
phobia: temporary burial in a coffin) was passing away, struggles for control 
of the body's health raged fiercely, ranging from the phrenologists and mes-
merists to the newly established American Medical Association (1847). Faced 
with the collapse of local communities as bases of knowledge and advice, 
many writers were suspicious of rising professionalism. Samuel 1110mson's 
Narrative of the Life and Medical Discoveries (which saw thirteen editions after 
its first printing in 1822) complained that the vacuum of traditional authority 
had created a gullible public ripe for the plucking by predatory physicians. 
Equally intriguing is how some reformers, while opposing the hegemony 
of doctors, became as dictatorial as Hawthorne's Puritans. For Sylvester Gra-
ham, to cite one example, physiology took. on the status of sacred law 
"which cannot be violated with impunity," he said, adding that no one can 
"move nor breathe nor exercise volition without obeying or violating penal 
laws." Mary Grove Nichols, a Graham sympathizer, wrote lectures, a novel, 
textbook chapters, and reminiscences which argued for the authority of sci- I 
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enc€, rationality, and law predicated upon experts who would certify 
whether such authority was being properly received. 
In contrast, reformers like John C. Gunn (who wrote the most popular 
medical care book in mid-nineteenth century America), Lydia Maria Child, 
and Harriot Hunt promoted a democratic relationship between subject and 
ruler. Cunn and Child converted garden herbs and kitchen contents into 
domestic "tools" to be used in medical treatments and instruments. Hunt be-
lieved patients were capable of (and required to) "speak their disease." In a 
symbiotic relationship, Hunt's patient and physician would develop a com-
munity of sympathy wherein "the little word WE" would help to effect re-
covery. First and foremost, the patient must learn "to utter yourself in confi-
dence and trust" after searching for a language which enables such utter-
ance. One can easily see how this medical opinion relates to literary and 
historical matters including Dimmesclale's need to confess to his community, 
Gilman's nervous monologue in "The Yellow Wallpaper," and William Se-
ward's wife who, by acceding to her doctor's authority, allowed herself to be 
bled to death. 
These are some of the main issues in Healing the Republic's first section 
whose purpose is to clarify general issues. Among other issues in this section 
is the insistence that the body signified the nation. As Burbick puts it: "In 
the language of health, if the individual could sustain well-being, sense dis-
ease, reflect, read, listen to good advice, and act properly f then a free society 
could be upheld and, when necessary, healed." In doing so, it was necessary 
to dissect and to disjoint various bodily parts. As Burbick explains: "In order 
to construct social order and maintain hegemony, a topology of the body 
emerged during this period that privileged particular parts of the body. The 
brain, heart, nervous system, and eye became keys to health and natural 
symbols that empowered particular groups to create systems of discipline, 
self-control, and understanding for the individual. Each body part resonated 
with a social philosophy and promoted forms of authority necessary for a 
healthy nation." 
Section Two of Burbick' 5 book attends to the values encoded in each of 
these four body parts. The first and last chapters~the managing brain and 
the technological eye-are the strongest parts of the entire book, and some 
readers will be familiar with the former since a version of it was previously 
printed in Prospects; An Annual of American Cultural Studies. In this Section, 
Burbick asserts that Ahab conformed to a medical superintendent's warning 
that the imbalance of the brain and the excessive ambition of "exceptional 
men" resulted in social disorder, and Moby-Dick's definition of monomania 
echoed the definition found in the Penny Cyclopaedia popular in Melville's 
day. The unstable grammar and punctuation of Dickinson's verse was a 
"nervous" language which challenged cerebral knowledge. The stomach, 
nervous or otherwise, was often claimed as a tIna tural symbol" of the war-
ring elements in cultural distress. The eye was assisted by numerous inven-
tions-the zootrope, the phenakistiscope, the thaumatrope, the magic lan-
tern, the daguerreotype-which transformed ordinary phenomena into the 
spectacular and which, by dissociating scene from its viewer, promised 
objective truth. Of particular interest is Burbick's account of the use of slides 
in mental asylums to relieve boredom, to control patients' conduct, and to 
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provide "evidence" to inmates of an independent, exterior world outside 
their D"Wll subjectivity and delusion. 
Anecdotal information is, in fact, this book's most attractive feature. In-
deed, the information in the lengthy footnotes is often as usefu1r relevant 
and as interesting as the material in the text. Some readers might find the 
least attractive feature to be the book's frequent but wispy allusions to cur-
rent theorists like Geertz, Bakhtin, Gramsci, and Foucaulti since these allu-
sions are seldom developed, they distract from the anecdotal review. Still 
other readers may have problems with Burbick's consideration of the nine-
teenth century in its entirety since the century is marked by vast literary and 
cultural shifts and developments. The status of physician changed drastically 
from the founding of the AMA in 1847 to 1905 when the medical profession 
had gained all but complete mastery over the field, and literary emphases on 
Romanticism's possibilities yielded to the Naturalist's obsession with law 
and restriction. 
One final characteristic of this book is its tendency to raise fascinating 
questions which are summarily disposed of, leaving it to readers to construct 
more complete and complex responses. For example, Burbick mentions in 
passing that slaves were considered to have bodies different from Anglo-
American bodies, and one would like to have fuller discussion of this fasci-
nating idea, including whether conceptions of slave bodies changed when 
they gained freedom or if gender were a factor. Since Burbick performs ex-
cellent and thorough analysis of middle-class white women's role in 
"Healing the Republic," one wishes her to match that achievement in the 
book's other parts. This desire is felt most frequently whenever sex or eco-
nomics are involved; fine ideas surface which all too quickly sink out of 
sight. One wishes those ideas were either placed off the main path in foot-
notes or developed. That is, one wishes the book were either longer or 
shorter than its 350 pages. 
Still, Burbick proffers a wealth of material interlaced smoothly across 
many textual disciplines. Perhaps her best contribution, aside from the anec-
dotal, is her faithful attention to the anxieties and tensions recorded in the 
discourse on health in nineteenth-century America. One of the skillful pas-
sages wherein Burbick articulates this tension reads: " ... the autonomous, 
universal body did not unify the nation, but gave its citizens a grid upon 
which they wrote their fears about the republic. The brain, heart, nervous 
system, and eye as sites of the body created a rhetoric of health that strug-
gled to establish order while revealing fundamental value conflicts. Body 
sites valorized particular forms of labor, created hierarchies of race, class, 
and gender, and offered solutions dependent upon kinship, conversion, 
proper moral sensibility, and even genetic make-up." To a considerable de-
gree, Burbick fulfills this ambitious thesis. 
Wayne State University Henry Golemba 
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Fatal Women: Lesbian Sexuality and the Mark of Aggression by Lynda Hart. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. 201. $35.00, cloth; $14.95, 
paper. 
Incriminations: Guilty Women!felling Stories by Karen S. McPherson. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. 215. $29.95. 
In a recent issue of The Nation (February 20, 1995) devoted to the growth 
of "The American Gulag: A Prison-Industrial Complex," Teresa Albor con-
tributed an essay, "No Family Values Here: The Women Get Chains ... ," 
which focuses on the state's incarceration of women without regard to the 
fact that many are primary caretakers for small children. As part of her in-
vestigation she offers the following statistics: "More women are now sent to 
prison than at any other time in the nation's history-the result, largely, of 
mandatory sentencing minimums and other strict federal sentencing guide-
lines .... between 1983 and 1992 the number of incarcerated women tripled. 
That's twice the rate of growth of the male prison population. ... They are 
predominantly poor minority women who have been inadequately educated 
and badly served in terms of health care. . . . Most women are in prison for 
non-violent or drug-related offenses. About 32 percent are in for drug sales 
or possession. Some 29 percent have committed crimes against property (lar-
ceny, theft, extortion, bribery or fraud) . .. . women in prison for violent 
crimes are more than twice as likely as men to have victimized a relative or 
intimate .... Those few women imprisoned for murder are likely to have 
killed people who they say abused them." Even as women are perceived as 
narrowing the gender gap in terms of numbers in prison, the motivation for 
committing crimes and the kinds of crimes committed suggest that criminal-
ity remains highly inflected by gender, as well as race. 
Two recent contributions to feminist scholarship consider the guilty 
woman, guilty either of aggressive behavior and/or of incriminating herself, 
as a way of shifting the blame away from the victim (of violence) to the fig-
uration of culpability in a system where subordination in and of itself incites 
suspicion and garners blame. Lynda Hart in Fatal Women begins with a cul-
tural imaginary that finds women incapable of aggression. When women 
achieve visibility as aggressive, they do so only by means of the appear-
ance/ disappearance of the lesbian who lurks, in the shadow, as secret. The 
impossibility of women's aggression is thus displaced onto the sexual ag-
gressiveness of the female invert. The lesbian, by actively desiring, becomes 
inherently criminalistic. The lesbian and the female offender share the effect 
of inversion: born women they become men, since active desire and aggres-
sion remain the prerogatives of masculinity. But becoming a man is only 
one way for woman to enter history as a criminal, although it is the one 
that Hart highlights. The other way is for two women to commit a crime 
together, the result of being too close. In this case it is not becoming a man 
but doing without men altogether that incites criminal behavior. Hart re-
minds us that Lacan based his theory of the mirror stage on Christine and 
Lea Papin, two sisters who as maids killed their female employer and her 
daughter in France in 1933. Delire il deux, he called it. 
According to Karen McPherson's work, Incriminations, women have been 
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framed, made to embody both interdiction and transgression. They can only 
plead guilty, like seventeenth-century witchducking, whereby women 
floated if guilty and drowned if innocent. Incrimination is not proof of guilt 
but it connects one to the "field of crime." To engage in storytelling may be 
inherently self-incriminating. But is it the women or the stories who aTe tell-
ing and on whom? Are the women guilty of telling stories or of telling their 
own stories? Or is someone telling on them? Narration, transgression and 
gender are found to be inscribed as intertext in the novels of twentieth cen-
tury women writers. By locating the policing-of women and of meaning-
one then is able to identify the prohibition and the violation, and thereby as-
certain the imputed crime. 
As contributions to feminist scholarship in the field of cultural representa-
tion both of these books not only shift the focus from victim to criminal but 
also from flimages of women" as object of analysis to processes of significa-
tion whereby female subjectivity is the subject of an ongoing suspicion. Hart 
is not looking for the lesbian behind the criminal, but for the lesbian's ap-
pearance and disappearance in the making visible of woman's aggression. 
McPherson is not interested in the scene of the crime but in the arrival of the 
police in as much as it can tell us something about what is being policed. 
They are interested in the intersection of language and law only in as much 
as it inscribes women as impossibility and puts them in an impossible situa-
tion. For Hart lesbianism begs the question: what does it mean to prohibit 
something that doesn't exist? Desire between women can't exist if sexuality 
can only be imagined as phallic; thus to crirninalize lesbianism would mean 
to bring it into existence as discursive and thus sexual possibility. For Mc-
Pherson women's writing begins with the question: what does it mean for 
the story to be about not being able to tell the story? Women's voices have 
been associated with nagging and gossip, with fatal seductions, with exceed-
ing the narrations told to and for women. Telling a story becomes an act of 
transgression because the very act of speaking incriminates the teller en-
gaged in breaking the silence. 
To not be interested in the image of woman as either victim or criminal, 
but rather in the appearance of lesbianism or in the voices of women, means 
also not to privilege the genre of crime-the mystery or thriller-as the site 
of criminality in fictional discourse. Only one of the novels McPherson fo-
cuses on involves an historically documented crime, Anne's Hebert's Ka-
111ouraska, based on the murder of a man by his wife and her lover in Quebec 
in 1839. In the other texts she discusses, Simone de Beauvoir's L'Invitee, Mar-
geurite Duras's Le Ravissemel1t de Lal V. Stein and Virginia Woolf's Mrs. Dal-
loway, criminality takes various forms, ranging from gender as a pretext for 
blaming to the resistance of a heterosexual imperative. In de Beauvoir, in the 
absence of the inscription of police, the analysis begins with the proliferation 
of a crime-related vocabulary in order to read the murder as a way of wip-
ing out the real crime, that of betrayal. In Duras the criminal is inscribed in 
textual strategies that create sound metonymies between the words cri, crise 
and crime so that the "ravishing" takes the form of a violent act of displace-
ment. In Hebert the passe simple narratologically buries the crime that insin-
uates itself on the present where the price of survival is guilt. In Woolf the 
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policing is done by medical men who assign the guilty role to the madman 
as both non-normative and scapegoat. 
The readings McPherson offers are extraordinarily detailed and extremely 
elegant. They assume that one has read these novels, preferably yesterday. 
They inscribe the author in ingenious ways: by writing this novel de Beau-
voir has killed Olga (as opposed to Sartre) on paper, but by dedicating it to 
her fails to leave a body. They offer insightful observations into the relation 
between language and power: in Hebert the language of the law is English 
while the language of the crime is French. But the intense attention to words 
on the page draws attention to the arbitrariness of the choice of texts: 
L'Invitee has no police; Mrs. Dalloway has no crime. Woolf's text comes last 
rather than first and is the only one written in English. 
If history and cultural context don't matter, what about gender? The book 
begins with a slight embarrassment about fOCUSSing on IIwomen's voices" as 
oppositional strategy since as post-Derridean readers we recognize this trope 
as belonging on the heap of "dead metaphors." It ends with the 1989 Mon-
treal massacre where a single gunman shoots fourteen students at the Ecole 
Polytechnique whom he has singled out as feminists. As well-trained readers 
we can identify "dead metaphors." As feminists we want to speak out 
against and on behalf of dead women. But will an unexamined investment 
in explication de texte help us do that or will it just remind us that no matter 
how well we read, we could still be shot for it, we might still be found dead, 
we can never not be guilty of speaking? 
Hart dedicates her book and devotes the last chapter to Eileen Wornos, the 
first so-called female serial killer, who waits on death row for having con-
fessed to killing seven white middle-aged men as a hitch-hildng prostitute. 
She pleads self-defense, seeing nothing wrong with killing those who would 
have killed her, and shows no remorse, even as she wishes it hadn't hap-
pened. The confession of her crime was for the sake of her lover, another 
woman, and her redemption has taken the form of formal adoption by a 
newly born Christian, again a woman. To make sense of this historical event 
in terms of the criminal woman as both problem and solution to a male 
homosocial economy, Hart returns to the Victorian villainness in Mary Eliza-
beth Braddon's Lady Audley's Secret; the first homosexual woman on stage 
who appears in Wedekind's Lulu plays; the repression of the lesbian in fe-
male buddy films, primarily Thelma and Louise; the aggression of Karen Fin-
ley'S performance art that makes it possible for her to join the censored 
"NEA Four" as the only heterosexual; Single White Female as the fear on the 
part of white men of their own non-reproduction by either African-American 
women or lesbians; and Basic Instinct where the relationship between two 
women makes it impossible to !mow which one committed the crime. 
In this case the selection of texts seems less arbitrary because their reason 
for being there has to do with a retelling of the master narrative, the La-
canian psychoanalytic one. The book begins by historicizing the invert of 
sexology, the female offender of criminology and the narcissist of psycho-
analysis by showing how they all inform each other at the tum of the 20th 
century. Even as the law seeks to uncover the criminal's secret, which he 
himself knows, and the psychoanalyst seeks to discover the hysteriC'S secret, 
which is kept even from herself, in the end, Hart admits to agreeing with 
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Lacan that Woman does not exist, except as man's symptom. If man's desire 
is for desire, Woman as symptom is "the non-existent obstacle that functions 
as the cause of man's desire" (133). Eileen Wuornos, then, refuses to function 
as man's symptom and instead becomes his scapegoat. But does this tell us 
anymore about the appearance of the first female serial killer OTvar€ we being 
taught one more time how to read Lacan, this time with a little Zizek added? 
Hart does make me think further about the representation of lesbianism as 
both impossible and prohibited; as both autoeroticism and a desire that ex-
ceeds visual representation; as mutual masturbation and the pleasure 
women have no reason to renounce; as both so invisible that it poses no 
threat and so threatening that it becomes apocalyptic. Even as Hart makes 
clear from the beginning that her focus is on the lesbian as white, a chapter 
on race argues that this is so because the addition of racial difference would 
produce an alterity more terrifying than pleasurable for the white heterosex-
ual male imaginary. But did she learn all this from Lacan or from these Hol-
lywood films? If a cultural studies approach expands the repertoire of texts, 
then why limit their potential meanings to those offered by a single model of 
reading? Woman does not exist can offer a useful theoretical construct for 
countering liberal feminism's assumption of ontological sameness, but what 
is the connection between that non-existence and a woman on death row? If 
the book is dedicated to "all the women who have been vilified, patholog-
ized, and murdered for defending themselves by whatever means neces-
sary," what defense is there against the episternic violence of Lacanian psy-
choanalysis? Woman does not exist, just as the phallus can never be had. But 
isn't the confusion between phallus and penis one way to represent male 
sexual violence? In which case the confusion between The Woman and 
women would be another way to understand why women can be made not 
to matter. 
Do I really want or need to know this much about these four novels? Do I 
really want to have Lacan explained to me one more time? Reading each of 
these books reminds me of what it is I am capable of understanding, but not 
what it is that I want to know, or what it is that I should know to make 
sense of this particular moment in history. I want to know what it means 
that national focus has shifted from woman as victim to woman as criminal. 
I want to know why it is happening now. I want to know what it feels like to 
know (in the sense of Raymond Williams' "structures of feeling") that vic-
tims of violent crimes are women who haven't been able to defend them-
selves and that for women to defend themselves is still perceived as inher-
ently transgressive. "What does this mean for academic feminism, twenty-five 
years after women appropriated transgression as a means of liberation? 
Either we notice the man with the gun before he shoots us (unlike Nicole 
Simpson), or we point the gun at him, like Eileen Wuornos. Or, as writers, 
we are left putting on the body of (the dead) Judith Shakespeare. Which is 
what Woolf suggested, almost seventy years ago. Only this time honticide 
has corne to replace suicide. 
Which is what these books set out to do when they insist on "writing be-
yond the ending" in the form of an "afterword" (Hart) and a "post(mod-
ern)script" (McPherson). Is it any coincidence that both of them end by 
discussing the texts of lesbian writers, Deb Margolin's Lesbians Who Kill and 
c 
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Nicole Brossard's Le desert ma1lve? Psychoanalytic theory reminds us that 
Oedipus both desired and corrunitted a crime, that (incestuous) desire ,vas 
not his only crime. But in as much as the lesbian is both impossible (within 
psychoanalysis) and prohibited (by the law), maybe only she can speak from 
the dead, and thus for the dead, at this particular moment, in history and in 
the production of feminist knowledge. Meanwhile, other women, many with 
children, mostly women of color, continue, in increasing numbers, to sit out 
sentences in prison. 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Anne Herrm'l.Im 
Subjective Agency: A Theory of First-Person Expressivity and its Social Implica-
tions by Charles Altieri. Blackwell, Pp. ix + 306. $54.95. 
Vamps and Tramps: New Essays by Camille Paglia. New York: Vintage, 1994. 
Pp. xxv + 532. $15.00. 
In his new book, Charles Altieri attempts to provide a theoretical account 
of how people express and manage their identities, arrive at decisions, form 
judgments, understand others, and in general make their way around. He 
depicts himself as an outsider to philosophy, although three out of four Li-
brary of Congress headings under which the book is filed include the word 
"Philosophy"; and says that he is chiefly concerned to map a middle ground 
betvveen the "ascetic vigilance" of philosophical rigor, and the cultivation of 
aesthetic "fascination." Neither traditional philosophy nor poetry, Altieri 
contends, can do justice to the intricacy or value of human action; but be-
tween the tvvo lies a huge logical space in which an account of human 
agency in all its dimensions from the psychological to the political, an ac-
count both rigorous and responsive, might be able to flourish. Subjective 
Agency, Altieri claims, is that account. 
Unfolding over seven dense and challenging chapters, the argument is 
constructed as a realization of certain tendencies of what Altieri identifies as 
the "expressivist tradition," whose primary representatives are said to be 
Spinoza, Hegel, and Wittgenstein. Arn.ong the contributions of this tradition, 
Altieri claims, is a refusal to embrace the dominant "Romantic" assumption 
about the subject, that some definite but inchoate imler self struggles to 
achieve expression in the form of articulate judgments, utterances, and ac-
tions. Altieri wants to redescribe the subject by eliminating all talk of in-
\vardness and concentrating on agency alone, which, he says, "performs 
itself" as subjects will their identities by "enacting certain investments" or 
by "shaping substance in contexts that recur" (87, 87, 110). "\Vill," he Sil).'S 
in this vein, "is not a matter of inner life," but is "simply the aligning of con-
ative energies with the world, so that they seem continuous with it and 
effective within it" (50). 
It really is simple, for everything lies on the perceptible surface, and is 
largely manifest as "style," a term that carries the burden of indi\"iduation in 
the nbsence of a deep interior core. As a way of approaching the full dimcn-
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sians of style, Altieri introduces Kantian aesthetics. Aesthetic shaping, Altieri 
argues, can be understood as a model for the ways in which people create all 
kinds of purposive structures; and aesthetic understanding can be adopted 
as a template for the attribution of purposiveness, the way in which people 
apprehend the internal relations of /I expressions" as the result of intentional 
acts. In both instances, people experience an obligation to bring their "first-
person" dispositions into alignment with "third-person" or impersonal cri-
teria of judgment, in the process defining and realizing themselves by ap-
pealing to communally held standards and modes of understanding. 
From here, Altieri develops a skeletal ethic that focuses on "making the 
symbolic more responsive to differences among practices and making agents 
more capable of manipulating what the symbolic order can prOVide them as 
powers and entitlements" (167). And then, in a final chapter, he spells out 
"rno basic imperatives for politics" that follow on his account of subjective 
agency: "that we foster institutions which keep continual pressure on us to 
present justifications appealing beyond the circle where we are secure in our 
assessments, and that we consider the fundamental political value to be the 
activity of responding to such pressures civilly and with a desire for justice" 
(230). 
As the quoted passages may already have suggested, it is not inunediately 
apparent exactly what this book does or why it does it. It does not describe 
something that already exists, nor does it analyze, nor does it exhort. With a 
few exceptions, it does not engage in detailed, extended critical readings of 
other philosophers, even of Spinoza and Hegel, who are generally viewed 
from a distance. What it does is generate arguments of great abstractness, of-
ten presented as adjustments of arguments from previous philosophers con-
sidered to be in the main friendly to the overall enterprise. And the reason it 
does so is, apparently, to provide a philosophical sanction for attitudes and 
ways of thinking that Altieri considers praiseworthy. 111e least civil formula-
tion of the project of Subjective Agency would be to locate reasons for a good 
conscience, a sense of grounding, a historico-theoretical warrant for doing 
what we feel needs to be done anyway, but for other, nontheoretical reasons. 
Need plays, in fact, an unusually prominent role in Altieri's discourse, which 
continually refers to "the argument I need," "the contrastive ground I need," 
"the role I want this structure to play," the fact that he "need[s] a distinctive 
realm of the ethical," and so on. The dust-jacket blurb begins by saying that 
"For the past decade, the most pressing need in the humanities has been"-
for a book just like this one. In this respect, the argument itself mimes and 
reinforces aspects of its own message by proceeding as though inconsistent 
or incongruous elements, e.g., interiority, can be ignored if not eliminated. 
This pruning impulse is virtually responSible for the "expressivist tradi-
tion" itself, all the participants in which have contrary elements to be excised 
or argued around-Spinoza's religion, Kant's first rno Critiques, Hegel's 
version of historicism and his emphasis on the state, parts of Wittgenstein-
that make it seem on balance less a genuine philosophical consensus than a 
heavily censored construct. "Since I am the one who gets to establish the cri-
teria here," as Altieri says at one point, he can of course construct away 
(148). But at a deeper level, what Altieri casts as a desirable "will to power 
over one's situation" has also been applied, in his discourse, to the construc-
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tion of a theoretical model of the subject itself (129). After a while, a reader 
begins to notice that despite the formidable complexity of the prose, certain 
things are missing from the Altierian subject. Chief among these is what is 
commonly thought of as subjectivity itself-the feelings, thoughts, responses, 
and perceptions that seem both involuntary and deeply personal, the whole 
range of "inneru phenomena not easily coordinated with a "third-person" 
perspective, as they are not immediately lIarticulate as purposive, and hence 
as capable of bearing responsibility" (129). 
More precisely, Altieri's agents lack a proper unconscious. Altieri appears 
to sense some deep threat to ethical and social- projects from the various 
forms of unconsciousness posited by psychoanalytic and postmodem theory. 
Skewing judgments, producing disorderly symptoms, undercutting our best 
interests, the unconscious interferes with the articulations, determinationsl 
negotiations, and attributions on which Altieri stakes his project. Thus, in a 
book about the subject, Freud is never mentioned, Lacan introduced only to 
be dismissed, Foucault consigned to the notes, I,;yotard virtually absent, Der-
rida rendered ineffectual through paraphrase, Z~ek almost totally ignored 
and his name consistently botched. The unconscious is not quite a world 
unto itself, but Altieri seems to wish it were. "I will ignore the many ways in 
which this model can go wrong," he says on one occasion, bracketing off all 
forms of "self-delusion" and "manipulation by others" (94). 
The indifference to counter-examples indicated here actually signals a 
more general resistance to exemplification as such, a willingness to set aside 
anything that ripples the surface of the theory. On the rare occasion when 
something more specific than the general principles of agency erupt into the 
discourse, the effect is bewildering: "Practices have rationales and rationales 
implicate ideal exemplars who extend beyond the specific social community 
into other levels of cultural traditions, a condition I find best illustrated by 
the four worthies who sat on Jefferson's mantle. Moreover the demand for 
reasons can lead beyond images to affiliations ... " (163). The resistance to 
exemplification is most pronounced, however, when the talk turns to "social 
implications," which are kept scrupulously vague through nonspecific refer-
ences to lithe politics most academics espouse," or cliches about IIweakening 
the authority, if not the power, of the governing elite, and hence ... foster-
ing democratic values" (221, 8). Altieri defends this hypertheoretical general-
ity with the cryptic pronouncement, which seems to reflect an embittered 
"Berkeley" perspective, that since "few people actually like or admire those 
who push the limits of free speech," only a sustained concentration on "the 
formal structure of subjective investments" can ensure the integrity of the 
institutions on which the functioning of liberal society depends "when the 
inevitable disillusion sets in" (222). 
One measure of the resilience of liberal institutions is their capacity to en-
dure the expressions of Camille Paglia, whose Vamps and Tramps, 532 pages 
of limit-pushing materials produced during the past two years, was pub-
lished in October 1994. Most academics certainly neither like nor admire her; 
her personal style offends, as when she boasts about being the only feminist 
to boast about how many people she's punched out. But like all styles, hers 
can be considered under the rubric of subjective agency. Indeed, she and Al-
tieri have a lot in common: both are prolific Italian-American academics who 
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spC<lk rapidly, advocate libertarian views, and acknowledge the friendship of 
Robert C<1scrio, who must be a remarkable man. We can grasp the relation 
between them most efficiently, however, by asking what subjective agency 
would look like, extricated from Altieri's impacted abstractions and fifty-
word sentences and set loose in the world. The answer: it might look like 
Vamps alld Tramps, which both exemplifies Altieri's project and subjects it to 
fierce pressures. 
So a],uming and idiosyncratic is Paglia's style that many miss, or dismiss 
the substance. But as these essays, interviews, transcripts, and reviews dem-
onstrate, an argument, predicated on expressive activity particularly in the 
field 01 sexuality, informs Paglia's manifold self-exhibitions. Altieri acknowl-
edges that "accounting for the force of ... gender will be a problem for me 
throughout this book," and says that he wants to get at those deep-laid as-
pects of subjectivity that are beneath such categories (233). For Paglia, there 
is nothing beneath sexual personae except, perhaps, a bed. Humans are 
sexed, and while their desires and identities can take deeply complex, indi-
rect, ,lnd confused forms, we all fall under an obligation issuing from nature 
to get on with it. Or, as she puts it "I 'would say to men: get it lip! And to 
women I would say: deal with it!" (16). 
\'v'hile Vamps alld Tramps is many things, there is no mistaking what it is at 
any given moment. It is a description of the facts of sexual life as Paglia sees 
them, a commentary on current cultural energies circulating around this sub-
ject, and, as the preceding quote demonstrates, a sermon> Paglia is perhaps 
morc notorious for her style than for her substance, but this volume, contain-
ing a number of carefully considered, quietly eloquent passages and pieces 
thilt arc entirely lacking in self-importance, including mature and original 
considerations of Princess Diana, Bmbra Streisand, Jacqueline Onassis, and a 
beautifully evocativc memoir of four gay male friends, makes a strong case 
for her <1S a writer plain and simple> It would be a pity, of course, if the im-
prcssivc writerly virtues of some pieces were permitted to overshadow the 
bullying, clamoring, narcissistic outrageousness of others> 
But what is most conspicuous here is the extraordinary range of her re-
sponsi\'l~ness, which cmbr<1ccs-among a great many other subjects-Ma-
donna, Judy Garland, Bizet's Carl11en, Monika Trcut, Sandra Bernhard, the 
Alice books, Lo/ita, love poetry, the First Lady ("Kind of a Bitch: Why r Like 
I-li!l<lry Clinton"), Germaine Grecr, Susan Sontag ("Sontag, Bloody Sontag"), 
Edw,lrd Said, and films and books too numcrous to mention> Vamps and 
Tram/'s is best read quickly, a burst of reading followed by a period of quiet 
rL'flL'ction in which memorablc·im<1ges ilnd phrases swim before the mind's 
eye: l\lgHa shouting down anti-pornography activists in the streets of Nel;v 
York ("This is /Iullshif! Buflshif! /makes flggrcssi'(.J(' Rolling Stalles tass of the l1Iikel 
Y(lll /'((ll!it- ~LlCK!" 1290]) . P<lgHa decrying 'lthe creeping fascism of the 
d,llL'-r<lpe h~>;-;terii1" llrcilL'str<lted by "St.llinist" feminists (37). Paglia in-
!prming ~tLldL'nts ,It Han'<lrd, Princeton, Penn, and Johns Hopkins that their 
1,1Cttlty ~Iinks . > P,lgli,l responding briskly to "sanctimoniolls, nebbishy" 
\:0,1111 Clwmsky (-l9.5) > .. Paglia prL'dicting th<lt if she .mel Sontag ever mel, 
thl'~> "\\>iluld ~l.1p L"lCh other sill(' ... (357). 
UnL' thing th,lt ~l'h P,lglia <lr,lrt frnm the gener<ll run of ri\><ll-slapping, 
t,\(tdt~·-tr,bhing. ll'~hj'ln-h.lting iL'sbiafl l'\.pressi\>ists i~ her rl'peilted (ill! for 
-
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academic sobriety in the form of "a return to a general education based on 
hard facts and respect for scholarship" (385). It is not only the politics most 
academics espouse that excites her contempt, but their scholarship as well, 
precisely because the latter is too often placed at the service of the former. In 
a word, she attacks the tendency of scholarship to be need-driven rather than 
truth-driven, to conform to what we want rather than to what is. 
Paglia earns her own stripes in this tricky area in the lead essay of the vol-
ume, "No Law in the Arena: a Pagan Theory of Sexuality," a long, six-part 
exploration of the complex interplay of sex, law, criminality, deviance, and 
culture. Here Paglia ventures into dark waters, arguing that: "beauty itself 
may be an incitement to destroy" (34); "cock teasing is a universal reality" 
(35); "sex crime is revenge against women for wounds already suffered by 
men as a class" (37); IIwe career women [argue] from expedience" and not 
from ethics in promoting abortion rights (39); women who decide to have 
abortions are agents of "Darwinian triage" (41); laws against sexual harass-
ment impose "a genteel white lady'S standards of decorum on everyone" 
(49); "middle-class white women have got to learn to talk trash with the rest 
of the human race" (51); most career women are unsuited for top managerial 
jobs (54); pornography does not subordinate women and should be pro-
tected, even cherished (passim); homosexuality is not an inborn trait and IInot 
'norma!,'" but a (rare) adaptation (70); homosexuality may be "a pausing at 
the prepubescent stage when children anxiously band together by gender" 
(78); lesbians are a dull lot (passim); and that "hot sex and healthy children 
cannot be produced by eunuchs," i.e., by feminist-trained men (86). 
The remarkable thing about this list of abrasions is it flatters nobody, in-
cluding Paglia herself. Nobody needs these truths, if that's what they are. 
What really distinguishes it from the verities most academics espouse, how-
ever, is a pair of implicit equivalencies. The first is between the Wl.acceptable 
and the desirable; and the second is between the unacceptable and the true. 
So various and kinetic, Paglia's thought is organized around two basic argu-
ments: that people want what they disapprove of, and they deny what they 
know. She celebrates the first and seeks to correct the second. In both re-
spects, she sets herself up as a specialist in, and a proponent of, "the many 
ways in which this model can go wrong." 
Paglia's nearly absolute stylistic difference from Altieri reflects a range of 
divergent positions, attitudes, orientations, and prejudices. But these differ-
ences mask deeper convergent currents, ways in which each implies the 
other. She is not only the most flamboyant example of subjective agency-
albeit an example that nearly overwhelms the theory it exemplifies-but also 
the "contrastive ground" Altieri really does need. He can say with justifica-
tion that while Paglia can box her comer, others who are just as far out of 
the mainstream but less able to defend themselves must be able to count on 
a community commitment to a weakly specified liberalism that honors "ex-
pressions" in general. For her part, Paglia needs precisely such "frigid, head-
tripping nerds" (a phrase she applies to Foucault [105]) as Altieri; they elicit 
much of the distinctive tang of her sensibility and without them there would 
be no Paglia. 
One difference, however, remains. While Altieri envisions IItwo hundred 
readers" (247), Paglia can safely count on, let us say, many times that num-
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ber. Why should this be, when Altieri addresses our pressing need by articu-
lating notions from which dissent is difficult, and Paglia gives us a gross 
flood of ideas and impressions that remain minoritarian? Among the less 
obvious reasons may be that Altieri's emphasis on conscious control and 
civic responsibility makes Subjective Agency a virtuous but strangely weight-
less book. Having argued for a depthless subject, he can only make a shal-
low claim on his readers' sympathies. By contrast, Paglia's ecstatic, infuri-
ated immersion in the superficies of life, and in those madmissible energies 
that elude and deform control is both gripping as spectacle and paradoxi-
cally deep in its appeal. People may not like or admire those who push the 
limits, but they do seem to want to read them. 
Tulane University Geoffrey Galt Harpham 
Aesthetics and Ideology, edited by George Levine. New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1994. Pp. ix + 316. $48.00, cloth; $20.00, paper. 
In an age in which iconoclasm is old hat, subversion is co-optation, and 
protest itself is the slippery slope to bourgeois complacency, a truly good 
book about academic and readerly trends is an exceptional feat. Cultural ma-
terialism has made cultural analysis a matter for a priori suspicion (not nec-
essarily a bad thing, of course), and so a book such as this one, which vari-
ously scrutinizes the discourse about cultural value, is a bold venture. 
Indeed, to identify a critical/theoretical zeitgeist is virtually impossible these 
days: to complain about the hegemony of the critical discourse about aca-
demic hegemony is to enter a world of peculiar solipSism, one that makes 
Romantic "inwardness" look dowmight accessible. But as this edition of es-
says makes emphatically clear, SOlne of the most notable voices in the analy-
sis of aesthetics and ideology belong to those who feel that aesthetics as ide-
ology is a construct that has gotten out of hand. The motivating concern of 
this collection, then, is the critical study of literature as such; none of the es-
says rejects the implications of ideological superstructure, and none is eager 
to return to some of the more benighted pieties of New Criticism. What they 
share in COIlUTIon, however, is an eagerness to remember a means by which 
aesthetics, and even hermeneutics, can be meaningful to human endeavor. 
The book is divided into four sections, each of which interrogates anew 
issues that are by now entirely familiar. The first section, Contingency and 
Value, contains essays by Arnold Rampersad and Myra Jehlen, and both in-
dulge in gestures of historical self-positioning that are recognizable as all but 
de rigueur. Rampersad's essay, "Values Old and New," does not add infor-
mation or chronicle a history of theory so much as it offers a straightforward 
polemic about the danger signs of polemics. Beginning with an admission of 
concern over the conference panel topic which initiated his discussion, he 
goes on to decry the process by which (as he sees it) a new antihumanism is 
quickly transforming itself into an old philistinism. This leads, he suggests, 
to a wholesale rejection of values that were only ever dimly understood in 
the first place, to be replaced by a set of devaluations and negative assump-
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tions that are somewhat questionable. One of Rampersad's concluding asser-
tions may well strike some as beyond the point of the current culture wars, 
but then again, his central claim is precisely that those fighting "the good 
fight" too frequently miss the point: "The fact that many' dead white men' 
have not only anticipated objections to hegemonic views of culture but also 
proposed disruption and heterogeneity as intrinsic to genuine culture will 
doubtless disappoint some. However, this is the kind of disappointment 
with which we should attempt to live, the kind that should deepen our con-
fidence in the wisdom of our basic enterprise, properly f and not chauvinisti-
cally, understood" (39). In "Literary Criticism at the Edge of the Millennium; 
or, From Here to History," Myra Jehlen contrasts essays she had written at 
different times for different volumes. In the wake of the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain, and with the acuity of corrective hindsight, she has come to con-
clude that the reflexivity that reveals the limits of any particular theory is 
the place in which flideological criticism reveals itself lTIOre imbricated with 
formalist and aestheticist approaches than was visible earlier" (52). 
These are claims that proceed by way of a debunking, not of the positive 
claims of ideological criticism so much as of the central focus of much ideo-
logical debunking. Put Simply, most of the authors writing here are on the 
defensive about aesthetics, whatever their varying political biases. As such, 
George Levine's introductory essay, "Reclaiming the Aesthetic," announces 
the volume's intention by insisting upon what the aesthetic is not: "And 
what I am attempting in this book and this opening chapter is movement 
toward a climate of opinion that will not identify deference to the text and 
admiration of it with political complicity, will not assume that the text is a 
kind of enemy to be arrested, will not inevitably associate the 'literary' with 
a reactionary right or dismiss the aesthetic as a strategy of mystification of 
the status quo" (3). The text is not an enemy to be arrested? It seems nothing 
short of startling that such contentions need be made at all. But they do, and 
so Levine proceeds to a statement of purpose that tries to find a way out of 
the embarrassment of a good read: "More pOSitively, I am trying to imagine 
the aesthetic as a mode engaged richly and complexly with moral and politi-
cal issues, but a mode that operates differently from others and contributes 
in distinctive ways to the possibilities of human fulfilment and connection" 
(3). 
To this end, the second section of the volume is entitled "Rewriting the His-
tory of the Aesthetic." Containing articles by Oscar Kenshur, Mary Poovey, 
Frances Ferguson and Geoffrey Galt Harpham, it seems a loosely unified-
though still provocative-assemblage of figures from literary history uniquely 
suitable to the task of decriminalizing the aesthetic. Kenshur, for example, 
studies the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, and 
asserts that his" absolutization of the aesthetic served not to remove it from the 
hudy-burly of political strife, but rather to transform it into a powerful instru-
ment for demystifying other ideas" (59). In "Aesthetics and Political Economy 
in the Eighteenth Century: The Place of Gender in the Social Constitution of 
Knowledge," Mary Poovey challenges Barbara Hernstein Smith's targeting of 
"aesthetic ideology" as rationalizations in bad faith, and then looks to the ex-
ample of Mary Wollstonecraft, who "was the first to recognize that one of the 
devastating effects of the modern constitution of knowledge was the cultural 
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denigration of women alongside (as part of) the valorization of aesthetic 
beauty" (81). 
These latter claims work nicely with the section about "Liberatory Aesthet-
ics," a collection of explicit political readings by Derek Attridge ("Literary 
Form and the Demands of Politics: Otherness in J. M. Coetzee's Age of Iron"), 
Regenia Gagnier ("A Critique of Practical Aesthetics"), and Cheryl A. Wall 
("On Freedom and the Will to Adorn: Debating Aesthetics and/ as Ideology 
in African American Literature"). It is noteworthy that the claims for the 
value of the aesthetic yield necessarily defensive postures, anxious assur-
ances of ideological awareness, and often indignant protestations of fully cre-
dentialed political commitment. The emerging tendency is to answer the in-
hospitality toward the aesthetic with a parry and thrust: not merely ideologi-
cally inflected, the aesthetic is cruCially conscious of historical exigency, or 
uniquely sensitive to populist appeals. Further-and more to the point-to 
banish it from the Republic of putatively anti-bourgeois professors of litera-
ture would be to grant the forces of hegemony their final victory. Derek At-
tridge'S essay is paradigmatic in this regard: "Coetzee's handling of formal 
properties is bound up with the capacity of his work to engage with-to 
stage, confront, apprehend, explore-----otherness, and hI. this engagement it 
broaches the most fundamental and widely significant issues involved in 
any consideration of ethics and politics. I also believe that what happens in 
Coetzee's work, and in responses to it, is only a more dramatic version of the 
processes involved in all literary uses of the formal properties and potentiali-
ties of language" (244). 
Attridge thus addresses an issue which is bound to be of increasing inter-
est to critics: can formalism be something more than the enshrined Other of 
political engagement? The prescribed answer here, of course is yes: yes, for-
malism has its place, or yes, formalism is the place in which such engage-
ments are most persuasively performed. But this may be a means of collaps-
ing categories, in ways that cancel the heuristic value of categorization. 
Thus, the section of this volume which is potentially the most combative, is 
in fact the most conciliatory. Entitled "Form, Disinterest, and Ideology," it 
contains essays by Peter Brooks ("Aesthetics and Ideology-What Happened 
to Poetics?"), Maria Dibattista (,"Sabbath Eyes': Ideology and the Writer's 
Gaze"), Susan J. Wolfson ('''Romantic Ideology' and the Values of Aesthetic 
Form"), and William Keach (" 'Words Are Things': Romantic Ideology and 
the Matter of Poetic Language"). For Susan Wolfson, as for the others writ-
ing in this collection, the value of close reading has lately been underesti-
mated. Thus, to escape the charge of ideological co-optation, we should 
show how poetic form" can be involved in processes of ideological critique-
how, in fact, attention to aesthetic formation in its particularities, densities, 
and complexities can be generated out of the very criticism that has emerged 
in antithesis to it" (190). Similarly William Keach would remind us that for-
malism is no enemy of the revolution: "The current task, as I see it, is to un-
derstand how critically to rethink and affirm the materiality of formal articu-
lation in art and literature-not just in an imagined socialist future, but in 
cultural situations that remorselessly reify, commodify, fetishize such articu-
lation. This is a version, of course, of what the Romantics themselves had to 
do, in economic and social circumstances that crucially anticipate our own" 
• 
,--
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(221). 
These represent important assertions, for they are insightful, observant, 
and emphatically need to be made. The latter day dismissal of aesthetics and 
aesthetic form in the name of political maturity has been an unfortunte phe-
nomenon, and the facts of the case need, certainly, to be re-stated as often as 
possible. But we also need to think hard about the implications of defending 
the critique of so-called aesthetic ideology by insisting that aesthetics was 
always primarily in the service of critique. This is not to say at all that such 
arguments are mere grasps at straws, only that we are in danger of misun-
derstanding, or at least of under-valuing, our own commitments to the text. 
Neither am I claiming that the contributors to this volume have gravely 
oversimplified the terms of their respective arguments. But we must exercise 
a special vigilance in this case; to defend the aesthetic on the grounds that it 
was always seif-conscious ideology is to offer it up for cannibalization. 
Alas, it is consumption indeed which we begin and end with-consuming 
texts, it is only natural that we wonder about our impulses to spit them out. 
But the aesthetic is always reconstituting itseif, and if we have developed a 
different stomach for it, as it were, then we will have to learn a healthy way 
of digesting it. This volume is a welcome aid to such an endeavor. 
University of Toronto Karen A. Weisman 
High Concept: Movies and Marketing in Hollywood, by Justin Wyatt. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1994. Pp. x + 237. $35.00, cloth; $17.95, paper. 
Having been a marketing analyst in Hollywood before becoming an aca-
demic professional, Justin Wyatt is especially qualified to examine the rise 
and dominance of high concept filmmaking in Hollywood since the mid-
1970s. In High Concept, Wyatt takes his cue from the work of David Bord-
well, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson (The Classical Hollywood Cinema: 
Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960 [New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1985]), who he says "develop classical Hollywood cinema as a particu-
lar stylistic system with clear economic and aesthetic determinants" (16). 
Wyatt praises Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson's seminal work, while man-
aging to point out that significant economic and institutional changes have 
occurred in Hollywood since 1960, making it necessary to examine how re-
cently "the conglomeration of the film industry and the rise of television, 
new marketing methods, and changing distribution strategies-have ex-
tended and modified some significant traits of the classical model" (16). 
Wyatt's first task is to define, or as he says "redefine," high concept. He 
cites two apocryphal Hollywood stories about tl,e origin and use of the term. 
TI,e first gives Barry Dmer, programming director at ABC in the early 1970s, 
credit for coming up with and exploiting high concept. According to Wyatt, 
"[slince Dmer needed stories which could be easily summarized for a thirty-
second television spot, he approved those projects which could be sold in a 
single sentence" (8). Diller's ideas for high concept TV movies produced hits 
like Briml's Song (1971) and That Certain Slimmer (1972), "whose themes and 
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appeal were immediately obvious" (8). Indeed, Diller's model is still in place 
for TV movies today, as the recent trio of Amy Fisher movies, one for each 
network, would suggest. The other potential source of the high concept ap-
proach could be Disney's Michael Eisner; "[a]ccording to [Jeffrey] Katzen-
berg, Eisner used high concept while working as a creative executive at 
Paramount to describe a unique idea whose originality could be conveyed 
briefly" (8). Regardless of who came up with the idea, the basic premise 
of high concept filmmaking is the same. As Wyatt suggests, "one can think 
of high concept as comprising 'the look, the hook, and the book.' The look of 
the images, the marketing hooks, and the reduced narratives form the cor-
nerstones of high concept" (22). 
Having redefined high concept as "the look, the hook, and the book," 
Wyatt feels the need to defend his project from would be detractors. He 
states, "[t]he attempt to construct this model of high concept should not be 
viewed as an academic spin on the critics' condemnation of commercial film-
making, nor as an attempt to glorify the popular. Rather the project ad-
dresses the initially curious supposition that Grease, along with Jaws (1975), 
Stnr Wars (1977), and Saturday Night Fever, is of greater Significance to Amer-
ican film history than the critically and institutionally recognized films of the 
period ... " (22). The question Wyatt is anticipating here is whether or not 
popular films should be given as much critical attention as the more "ser-
ious" films of the last twenty years. The obvious answer here, as demon-
strated by the recent boom of cultural and American studies programs in 
academia, is absolutely. In fact, looking at the "popular" has increasingly be-
come the norm in academic film studies as a recent course on the films of 
Keanu Reeves at Cal Arts indicates. In this light, it is a bit odd that Wyatt 
warns "canon builders" not to leave off popular films as "through under-
standing the commercial recipe and economic determinants of a film like 
Grease, one can gain a true appreciation of the contemporary landscape of 
American film-a landscape which has nurtured and privileged the high 
concept film" (22). It is only after digging into High Concept that this curious 
defense of an approach to film which considers the economic realities of the 
industry, at a time when such approaches are conunonplace, begins to make 
sense. For Wyatt is not attempting to include a discussion of the economic 
determinants in one or tvvo films, but rather wants to show how pervasive 
the high concept model is in shaping most of the current Hollywood com-
mercial product. Consequently, his book focuses, perhaps too narrowly for 
current academic tastes, on the economic aspects of high concept to the ex-
clusion of other concerns. 
That said, Wyatt's thorough analysis of the extent to which economic fac-
tors determine the "image and high concept style" of contemporary Holly-
wood cinema might be said to justify his exclusive focus on those factors. He 
sets up as his primary model the distinction between the high concept film 
Grease (1978), and the "low concept" All That Jazz (1979). According to Wyatt, 
Grease can be considered high concept for a variety of reasons. He cites the 
film's use of the stars John Travolta and Olivia Nevvton-John to attract a 
young audience, as well as fla host of media stars evoking the film's period 
of the 50's," to attract older audiences seeking the film's nostalgia. (4) He 
goes on to discllss the addition to the original Broadway score of two songs, 
m 
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"You're the One That I Want" and "Hopelessly Devoted to You," which be-
came hits in part for their '''contemporary' 70's sound." He further discusses 
the marketing of the film paying particular attention to the film's logo "a 
small car containing the word 'Grease' written in a fluid, grease-like style" 
(4). In short, he argues that every facet of the film, from pre-production 
through release, can, and should, be analyzed in economic terms. In contrast, 
All That Jazz, while critically praised, lacks all of the high concept qualities 
that made Grease such a hit, and financial success. It is therefore an example 
of the "low concept" filmmaking in which Hollywood is less and less in-
volved. 
While Wyatt's interpretation of Grease, and the hundreds of other films he 
examines, is not close reading in the classic style, it is a careful analysis of 
the economic determinants of the film. Wyatt's willingness to dig deeply 
into the marketing campaigns of various high concept films (he provides 
numerous lists and charts of movies that fit the bill) is perhaps the most re-
vealing part of his book. He also shows how some films fall in their efforts to 
conform to the high concept model-notably a discussion of the poster cam-
paign for The Hunger (1983) with Catherine Deneuve and David Bowie. He 
explains how high concept leads to more high concept as studios prefer to 
take fewer risks, and he discusses the effects of studio conglomeration, once 
again offering revealing charts and tables in support. In the end, his book is, 
as promised, a detailed look at the inner workings of the Hollywood eco-
nomic system and how that system has shaped the type and look of main-
stream films since the 1970s. 
Wyatt's book is one of those studies that is bound to enforce a new way of 
considering contemporary Hollywood cinema. He presents a new way to ex-
amine high concept film in greater detail instead of dismissing it as just an-
other crassly commercial product. As is the case with most methods of ana-
lyzing film, looking at films in terms of their conformity to high concept 
rules will prove most useful when combining the economic analysis with a 
variety of other approaches. His book is a bit high concept itself, though per-
- haps not to its detriment. It is full of charts, graphs, pictures and tables and 
somewhat mirrors the concern for style and "look and hook" that current 
Hollywood cinema displays, and may reflect a current trend in academia for 
more enticing publishing methods; however, its slickness should not detract 
from its potential usefulness in current film studies. 
Wayne State University Tim Coleman 
